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“Since most of what we hear is either plainly untrue, or half true and half distorted, and 
since most of what we read in the newspapers is distorted interpretations served as facts, 
it is by far the best plan to start out with radical skepticism and the assumption that most 
of what one hears is likely to be a lie or a distortion.” 
(Erich Fromm)1 
 
“The press is the hired agent of a moneyed system, set up for no other reason than to tell 
lies where the interests are concerned.” 
(Henry Adams)2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Whether in the time of war or peace, media, considered the ‘Fourth Authority’, must 
struggle to present the truth to the public, making no concession to any kind of 
authority, whether legislative, executive or judicial. This study, which adopts 
descriptive-analytical method, gives a brief account of the 2011 Arab popular revolts 
with reference to the media's significant role in war/conflict. Then, it investigates the 
manipulative role played by the official and semi-official visual media during the 
first six months of the Syrian Revolution. As a tool in the hand of the regime, these 
media outlets worked on propagating the regime’s adopted narrative. This narrative 
depicts the non-violent protestors as terrorist gangs, and conspirators supported by 
foreign imperial powers. The media’s manipulative role in the presentation of events 
and dissemination of information falls under the following categories: 
misrepresenting reports; the blame game; defaming the opponent; manipulating 
religious discourse and polishing the image of the regime. Examples are furnished 
for each category. Finally, the study calls for the core values of ethical media from 
the Islamic perspective, providing a blueprint for those who aspire to engage in the 
public information sphere and to ensure reliability and credibility in their profession. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The late year 2010 situated the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in a new era of 
profound social and political upheaval, witnessing the rise of populist movements of 
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opposition to authoritarian regimes. The immediate cause came from a Tunisian street 
vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi, who set himself on fire to protest his work conditions. (For 
socio-political, historical, economic, and cultural analyses of the Tunisian Revolution and 
its far-reaching impact see Ganea, 2013; Boubakri, 2015). 
The driving forces for change were as varied as the countries in which the events 
took place. Nevertheless, there were common grievances and causes: dictator leaders, 
government corruption, high rates of unemployment, deteriorating living standards, and 
growing inequality, and the like. The 2002Arab Human Development Report provides a 
detailed account and scathing assessment of the economic, demographic, social and 
political conditions in the Arab world in the period leading up to the uprisings. (See 
Baroudi, 2004; Gelvin, 2015, pp. 4-7; 25-27).  
A conflagration can develop rapidly from a spark falling on a dry brush. This is 
how the catastrophic Syrian Revolution broke out in mid-March 2011. The key catalyst 
came from a small southern town of Dar‘a, where a few schoolboys who, influenced by 
the wave of the popular mobilization, painted anti-government slogans on a school wall. 
(Lister, 2015, p. 12). Consequently, the teenagers got arrested and tortured by members of 
the Political Security Directorate. 3 In a peaceful demonstration, residents of Dar‘a voiced 
their grievances. 
 Instead of handling the situation appropriately, the secret service fired on 
protestors.  Meanwhile, Syrian people flooded into the streets showing solidarity with their 
countrymen of Dar‘a.  The Syrian regime’s ferocious repression only served to inflame the 
public’s outrage. After enduring months of arrests, torture, and murder, chants for freedom 
turned into rebellion, bullets and war. 4  
The role of information and communications technologies (ICT) in the dynamics 
of armed conflicts cannot be underestimated. News coverage can shape and reshape public 
perception of what and how the conflict/war is (or ought to be) occurring. “Existing 
differences in media reporting of political events may carry significant consequences for 
scientific inference, public knowledge, and policy” (Dzabija, 2016, p, 4). 
In their book, War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War, Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin “identify and illuminate the conditions of what they term ‘diffused war’ and 
the new challenges it raises for the actors who wage and counter warfare, for their agents 
and mechanisms of the new media and for mass publics” (2010, the book’s back cover ).  
The term ‘diffused war’ refers “to a new paradigm of war in which i) the mediatization of 
war ii) makes possible more diffuse causal relations between action and effect iii) creating 
greater uncertainty for policymakers in the conduct of war” (Ibid., p. 3). 
 The authors’ account of the process of mediatization of war is integral to 
understanding the dynamics of how the governments- revolutionaries conflict is perceived 
in the media, national and international. War becomes mediatized when the media are so 
entwined within the conflict that it would be impossible to understand the war without 
unless the involved role of the media is discerned.  (Ibid.). Because it is through media, 
war is ‘transformed’ and ‘reconstituted.’  (Ibid., p. 5). 5 
On the significance of conflict-sensitive reporting, Ross Howard, an international 
conflict expert, notes, “professional journalists do not set out to reduce conflict. They seek 
to present accurate and impartial news. But it is often through good reporting that conflict 
is reduced” (2003, p. 2). 
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Good journalism can deliver several elements of conflict resolution: channeling 
communication, educating, confidence-building, correcting misperceptions, identifying 
underlying interests, providing emotional outlets, framing the conflict, face-saving, 
consensus-building, solution-building, and encouraging a balance of power. (Ibid., p. 8-9). 
According to the UNESCO handbook on conflict-sensitive reporting, good 
reporting should be neither defamatory, derivative, malicious, nor corrupt. What is 
necessary to fulfill the requirements of so-called good journalism during a violent conflict 
is the following: being accurate, being impartial (keeping the balance), and being 
responsible. (Dzabija, 2016, p, 20). 
 
It is admitted, on the other hand, that media reporting depends on the extent 
of freedom on the ground. Where government pressure on the media is limited 
– in democratic regimes – the scope of reporting should reflect conventional 
media preferences toward novel, large-scale, dramatic developments that 
challenge the conventional wisdom and highlight the unsustainability of the 
status quo. Where political constraints on reporting are more onerous – in 
non-democratic regimes – the more conservative preferences of the state will 
drive the scope of coverage, emphasizing the legitimacy and inevitability of 
the prevailing order (Baum & Zhukov, 2015, p. 1). 
 
There is no doubt the post-2011 Arab Media are suffering from a multifaceted 
crisis, (ethical, bureaucratic, administrative, etc.). According to 2019 Press Freedom Index, 
Arab countries, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Syria are ranked among the worst 
20 countries. (“2019 Press Freedom Index,” 2019). Official and unofficial media, 
supposedly the 'Fourth Authority', became the communication mechanism of autocratic 
governments, not the people.   
The aim of this study is to assess the role of the Syrian media in the ‘mediatization’ 
of the Revolution via underreporting or overreporting of events, which, in turn, spawned a 
diffused war or conflict. For the purpose of the study, descriptive-analytical method is 
adopted. The study scope is limited to the official and semi-official visual media during 
the first six months of the Syrian Revolution, from March to August. This period is of 
particular importance, as during which the non-violent protest movement went militarized.6 
The selected samples are the Syrian TV, and Ikhbariya TV, Nour El-Sham,7  (official), and 
Addounia TV,8 (semi-official). 
  
 
On the other hand, the study calls for the core values of media ethics based on the 
Islamic perspective. These values provide a blueprint for those who aspire to engage in the 
public information sphere and to ensure reliability and credibility in their profession. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As the war on Syria has become a global event and a humanitarian crisis, substantial 
number of books, book chapters, journal articles, edited volumes, theses cover a myriad of 
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relevant research areas, including media coverage and reporting, at national and 
international level. 
 
Dzabija’s thesis (2016) investigates factors that affect reporting bias in the 
international coverage of the Syrian war. Taking three states as case studies, (Saudi Arabia, 
the United States and Turkey), this study analyses what types of events (rebel-induced or 
government-induced civilian casualties) the media in the above-mentioned states covered 
on 50 identified days of increases in a number of casualties between May 2014 and May 
2016.  In her project, Moufti, (2012) uses a reflexive design methodology with elements of 
graphic design and journalism as visual to observe media hegemony in the context of the 
Syrian Revolution. 
 
By contrast, al-‘Aridee’s study (2017) examines revolutionary media in terms of 
their rhetorical structure and linguistic patterns and, on the other hand, discusses some 
challenges that inhibited these media outlets from creating a viable alternative to the pro-
regime’s media. 
Fares (2015) compares the role of the pro- regime’s media with the working 
mechanisms of revolutionary media from 2011 to -2013. Further, he refers to the generally 
mediocre performance of pro-regime’s media, like favoritism, government censorship, lack 
of professionalism, etc.  
Chams Eddin’s thesis (2013) seeks to answer the key question “how effective was 
the official Syrian propaganda in dictating a narrative description of events on the ground 
in Syria which inhibited effective international support for democratic change?” (Ibid., p. 
ii). The writer focuses on the first sixteen months of the Syrian Revolution from March 
2011 to July 2012.  
While the above significant works fill the research gap in their respective  research 
area, this study  mainly focuses on how revolution/war in Syria during the first six months 
has been mediatized, transformed and reconstructed by the official  and semi-official media 
coverage, which reported almost exclusively on rebel-induced crimes and casualties.  
 
The Regime’s Propaganda 
Theoretically, the article 38 of Syria’s constitution calls for the right of free speech and 
press. When it comes to practice, however, this right seems null and void.  (“Freedom of 
the Press: Syria,” 2012). For example, the 1963 State of Emergency allows the authorities 
to arrest journalists under vague charges of threatening the national security.  (Ibid.) 
All media outlets in Syria are controlled and censored by high ranking military 
officials and the security services headquarters. (Fares, 2015, p. 187-188). Right from the 
very beginning of the uprising, official media had the full advantage of on-the-ground 
reporting, yet Arab and foreign media outlets were expelled and hence denied official 
access to events coverage. (See examples in “Freedom of the Press: Syria,” 2012). 
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The Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCMFE), a Damascus-
based nongovernmental organization, reported that the Syrian government called for a 
“formal declaration of war on the media” (Ibid.). Over one hundred cases of violations 
against journalists, correspondents, etc., from March to October in 2011, were documented. 
(Ibid.). 
The regime’s media, while completely cutting itself off from the established values 
of its profession, adopted the following strategies: 
a. Misrepresenting reports and distorting facts 
The regime, along with its coopted media, worked tirelessly to convince foreign people 
that Syria was fine, and nothing had gone wrong.  
For example, Addounia and Ikhbariya in April 2011, claimed that protesters in al-
Midan area of Damascus were nothing but citizens who were celebrating the blessings of 
rain after a period of drought.   (Fares, 2015, p. 190; Eddin, 2013, p. 46).9 
Putting a positive spin on the situation, Reem Haddad, (the then director of the 
Syrian television), told the BBC in an interview in June 13, 2011 that residents of Jisr al-
Shughour, a city in Idlib Governorate in northwestern Syria, near the Turkish borders are 
there to visit their relatives. (Fares, 2015, p. 190; Starr, 2012, p. 71).10 
b. the Blame game 
On quite many occasions on TV shows, the official media played the conspiracy card 
blaming foreign powers which were masterminding initial protests. Why? Because Syria 
is, and has always been, a country of resilience and resistance to the State of Israel and its 
allies.  
And here is the evidence! reports and news on weapons and money stored by 
terrorist and armed groups in the al-Omari Mosque in Dar‘a. (Eddin, 2013, p. 30). For the 
credibility of the reports, the media interviewed two famous figures in Dar‘a: sheikh 
Ahmad Sayasna, the imam of al-Omari Mosque, and Rizq Aba Zayd, the mufti of Dar‘a,11 
who affirmed the existence of ‘foreign conspiracy’. (Ikhbariya TV, 10 May 2011). What 
the audience was untold, however, is that both men had been blackmailed into appearing 
on television in order to provide credibility to the official narration. 12 
c. Defaming the opponent  
In the manner of defense mechanism, the state-run Media projects the regime’s own flawed 
attributes to the opposition.   
In the early days of the uprising, peaceful demonstrators carrying olive branches 
were labeled by the media as extremists, terrorists and conspirators. (Eddin, 2013, p. 28). 
The Syrian TV and Addounia broadcasted forced confessions of the so-called terrorists in 
Dar‘a. (Eddin, 2013, p. 30). Both TV stations also aired a number of shows to discuss the 
amoral character of some opposition figures, (e.g. homosexuality, political treason, bribery, 
etc.). (Fares, 2015, p. 190). 
Further, Bouthaina Shaaban, the main political and media advisor to 
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Assad claimed that Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Friday sermon, (March 25, 2011), represented a 
clear and direct call for sectarian strife in Syria. (“Majlis al-Sha’b al-souree yotalib al-
ra’ees al-Assad bi eidah al-islahat allati yanwee ‘itimadaha.” 2011). 
Addounia, again and again, broadcasted reports about al-Qaradawi followed by 
interviews with regime supporters who depicted him as a source of sedition encouraging 
Syrians to kill each other.  (Eddin, 2013, p. 42). 
In his sermon, al-Qaradawi merely praised the Syrian revolution and spoke 
metaphorically of the train of revolution arriving at the important station, likening the 
uprising to recent events in Tunisia Egypt, and Libya. (Ibid.). Yet, he did not instigate 
sectarianism.  
 
d. Manipulating religious discourse 
Syria is a country of religious diversity. The overwhelming majority of the Syrian 
population are Sunnis who account for about three-quarters of the Muslim population. As 
a predominant religion, Islam has deep roots in the Syrian soil playing a prominent role in 
shaping the social life as well as the culture of Syrian people.  
The Ministry of Endowments, the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, has gone to 
extraordinary lengths in implementing the regime agenda and attacking the Salafi-
Wahhabi-puritan thought. 
Within this context of the war of ideas, Nour El-Sham was instituted.  “Nour El-
Sham Satellite TV is a cultural and social channel mantling the cloak of Islam. It speaks 
for moderation, which is a characteristic of Bilad al-Sham.13 Specifically, Nour El-Sham 
adopts the religious moderation away from fanaticism, and violence, reflecting the 
religious discourse of Syrian scholars to counter deviant thought and extremist religious 
trends.”14. The ‘deviant thought and extremist religious trends’ refers to Saudi and Qatar-
based Salafists/ jihadists. 
To the annoyance of Salafi doctrine, Nour El-Sham quite often broadcasts Sufi 
gatherings in mosques, celebrating the birthday of the Prophet (PBUH) or engaging in 
dhikr (remembering Allah).15 
For nearly three years, Nour El-Sham used to broadcast Friday sermon by Ma’moun 
Rahmah, the post-revolution preacher of the Umayyad Mosque. This ultra-pro-regime 
sheikh transferred the pulpit into an anti-opposition platform, launching rhetorical 
offensives against Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etc.16 Meanwhile, he maintained constant 
glorification of the Syrian military, Hizbullah, Iran as well as Russia. 
On the other hand, there were Shari‘a scholars who refused to appear on TV, despite 
repeated requests. This ethical resistance drove the media outlets to host little or quasi-
scholars who would pontificate on a variety of big serious issues, such as Islam and 
democracy, political Islam, Islamist movements, etc. 
e. Polishing the image of the regime 
The media followed various tactics to prove to the wider public opinion the greater 
Syrian ‘support’ for the regime or the President.   
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For this purpose, the media frequently aired pro-regime demonstrations, songs 
praising Syria/the President, and interviewing ‘ordinary’ by passers17 who announce their 
rejection of the conspiracy theory and call for the national unity. (Fares, 2015, pp. 190-
191). 
 In fact, what was happening on the ground is different. A lot of so-called 'pro-
regime' demonstrators are nothing but government employees and workers who were 
forced to participate or else they would face the consequences. School boys and girls, 
requested to suspend their classes, joined the gathering. Even private minibus drivers were 
ordered to put their buses at the service of the demonstrations for the whole day. 18  
On the other hand, the Syrian TV regularly aired celebrations of the Syrian Army 
depicting them as heroes and liberators. (Eddin, 2013, p. 30). Regime forces, together with 
other supporting militias, have been found heroes, however, in killing, kidnapping, 
torturing, bombing as well as in “ta’feesh" phenomenon. This post-revolution term 
describes widespread systematic looting or stealing carried out by Syrian army and its allies 
in all deserted areas which fall under the regime control. ("National Defense Militias Loot 
Air Conditioners," 2019). 
 
DISCUSSION 
As mentioned above, media coverage in democracies emphasizes on change rather than on 
the status quo, yet in non-democratic regimes, news coverage reflects regime preferences. 
Consequently, in the case of protest movements, media tend to underreport or overlook 
government’s crackdown. (Dzabija, 2016, p. 27). 
Syria is known to be a state of intelligence, where the security of intelligent 
services, in conjugation with trusted elements of the military, has dominance in controlling 
people and in defending the regime against perceived threats, internal and external.  
According to Lesch, "Hafez al-Assad had largely established the mukhābarāt state in Syria, 
having created a tangled matrix of overlapping security agencies during his time in power" 
(2012, p. 5). Al-Assad’s long-term strategy has militarized nearly all resources and 
apparatuses of the state: economy, industry, security, education, as well as the media. 
 Reporters, newscasters, and journalists are appointed on the basis of the regime 
loyalty, as well as political and sectarian affiliation rather than on professional experience. 
(Fares, 2015, pp. 188-189; CF. Starr, 2012, p. 2). 
It is within this context of security’s hegemony, favoritism and censorship, the 
above strategies of the media are assessed and discussed.  
 “Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes the truth” (Stafford, 2016). The media 
seemed to hinge on this law of propaganda. But telling lies no longer functions in an age 
of mass information flow, let alone the lack of professional experience on how to convince 
others that your lies are true. As mentioned above, in the initial protests, the media claimed 
that protesters in al-Midan, Damascus, took to the street to celebrate the blessings of rain. 
And this is doubtless clumsy and absurd handling of the case. I distinctly remember how 
the regime and its news agencies became an object of ridicule and loathing in the social 
media at the time. Ikhbariya TV was thus named ‘the Channel of Rain.’  
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On the top of that, according to Addounia, where unrestrained lie emanates, Qatar-
based al-Jazeera constructed massive look-alike models of the cities of Homs and Hama 
and was broadcasting scenes of soldiers beating and shooting civilians. (Starr, 2012, p. 60). 
The reason why al-Jazeera was fabricating this news is to tarnish the image of the Syrian 
government. It is worth noting that this ‘Big Lie’ has been the preferred policy of the 
regime for decades. 
 In the 1980s, Mamdouh ‘Adwan, a Syrian poet of ‘Alawite sect, remarked, “The 
Syrian media keep lying even in the weather forecast.” 19 
As far as the blame game is concerned, one cannot deny the fact that what is 
happening now in the Middle East cannot be understood in isolation from various Western 
countries’ effort to create division and chaos in the Middle East. 
For instance, ‘KIVUNIM,’ a document written in 1982 by Oded Yinon, an Israeli 
journalist, clearly shows the Zionist Plan for the Middle East through the break-up of the 
Muslim countries into religious sectarianist divisions, as part of an Israeli expansionist 
project. (Shahak, 1982). This is obviously happening today with the balkanization of Iraq 
and Libya into small states and the use of trained insurgents sent into places like Syria to 
cause unrest and civil war.  
In 2006, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a visit to Tel Aviv 
spoke of ‘creative chaos’ to forge a ‘New Middle East.’ (Rihami, 2015, p. 116). The term 
‘creative chaos’ coincided with a flurry of activity on a project called the “Broader Middle 
East and North Africa.”  (Ibid.). It is not hard to see a linkage between the current turmoil 
in the region and this plan for redrawing a New Middle East.   
Equally, it is not hard to realize that the foreign conspiracy against Syria would 
not have been possible without the regime’s ferocious repression of protestors coupled with 
its reckless disregard for all political solutions. This stubborn policy has allowed to a brutal, 
protracted war mixing regional power struggles, and sectarian hatred. For example, 
Hizbullah’s sought intervention has heightened the 'sectarianization' of the conflict 
providing an emotional rallying point for popular mobilization. (Erlich, 2014). 
The official media’s one-sided reporting of events has reinforced the above- 
assumption about non-democratic government media on the one hand, and caused a climate 
of deep mistrust and irritation among Syrians towards the de facto ‘Fourth Authority’ on the 
other hand.   During his meeting with Bashar al-Assad in 2011, the Mufti of Damascus 
conveyed a massage of popular dissatisfaction with the amoral role of the media, “Mr. 
President, when we watch news via our media, we go disgusted.” The President replied, 
“You are right, our media are backward.” (A. Bezim, personal communication, March 24, 
2016). Due to the growing feeling of dissatisfaction, a lot of cases of defection from the 
media sector were reported. (Eddin, 2013, p. 47; “Freedom of the Press: Syria,” 2012). 
In search of an alternative to the official media’s narrative of the conflict, Syrian 
activists were able to construct a counter-narrative via social media, which supplied a space 
for a spectrum of opinions and events. (See Marnicio, 2014). 
 To borrow the Canadian law professor, Joel Bakans’ words, the regime’s media 
outlets are essentially a “psychopathic creature’, unable to recognise or act upon moral 
reasons to refrain from harming others” (Edwards & Cromwell, 2006, p. 3). 
 
Media Ethics: The Islamic Principle  
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Islam, in addition to being a religious and spiritual belief, is a coherent system of life, a 
social order, a philosophy of life, a system of economic principles, and a rule of 
government.  Islam provides its followers with a code of ethics that covers every aspect of 
life, including media. 
The most important of these ethics are as follows: 
 
 
a. Truth and justice 
}اَي  ََّلاأ ىَلَع ٍمْوَق ُنآَنَش ْمُكَّنَمِرَْجي َلاَو ِطْسِقْلاِب ءَادَهُش ِ هِلِل َنيِما َّوَق ْاُونوُك ْاُونَمآ َنيِذَّلا اَهَُّيأ َوُه ْاُولِدْعا ْاُولِدَْعت 
 ىَوْقَّتلِل ُبَرَْقأ{ 
  :ةدئاملا(8 ) 
"O believers, be steadfast in your devotion to God, bearing witness to the truth in all equity. 
And never allow your hatred of any people to lead you away from justice. Be equitable, 
that is nearer to godfearing." (the Qur’an, 5: 8).  
It is a legal and social obligation on the mainstream media to tell the truth, whatever 
it may cost.  The Arab revolts have made people rethink the role of the press/ media in 
disseminating true information and standing for the cause of justice. As a result, they turned 
to social media, as an alternative to governments’-controlled narrative of the conflict, to 
voice their concerns. (see Storck, 2013, pp. 3-4). 
b. Freedom and responsibility 
 
} ِني ِهدلا يِف َهاَرِْكإ َلا{  )   :ةرقبلا256 ( 
“There must be no compulsion in religion.” (The Qur’an, 2: 256). 
Islam sees faith as a matter of conviction. It never seeks converts by means of 
compulsion, threat or pressure. Therefore, as freedom of belief, the most basic human right, 
is guaranteed, other types of freedom (freedom of expression, conscience, press and so on) 
are protected and secured. (see Kamali, 1994). 
Everyone is free to express his or her opinion as a fundamental human right. 
Without the freedom of expression, the Islamic principle ‘commanding the good and 
forbidding the evil’ is impossible to put into practice. This freedom, however, should have 
certain limits and cannot be taken in an absolute sense.  (Jallow AY, 2015, pp. 1-4). 
Therefore, the media should practise freedom within the sphere of social 
responsibility. In newsgathering or news reporting, media professionals have to perform 
their ethical social responsibility of representing issues of concerns to others. For example, 
journalists face ethical dilemmas of balancing the competing rights of privacy and freedom 
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of expression or the right of the public to know. (See Malik, 2015, pp. 264-266; White, 
2011, pp. 12-14). 
c. Accuracy and authenticity 
} ًلاُوئْسَم ُهْنَع َناَك َِكئ ََٰلُوأ ُُّلك َداَُؤفْلاَو َرَصَبْلاَو َعْمَّسلا َّنِإ ٌمْلِع ِهِب ََكل َسْيَل اَم ُفَْقت َلاَو{ 
 :ءارسلإا(36 ) 
‘Do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Man’s ears, eyes and heart shall be 
called to account’ (The Qur’an, 17:36). 
One of its impressive characteristics is that Islam neither accepts assumptions nor 
permits anything to be based on suspicion or myth. Every theory, dogma, argument or even 
faith should be substantiated by concrete evidence and a solid foundation.  
Commenting on the above verse, Sayyid Qutb notes,  
These few words establish a complete method for the human mind and heart, 
incorporating the scientific approach that humanity has begun to apply 
recently…. Making certain of every report, action or situation before passing 
a judgment concerning it is the essence of the Qur’anic approach. (2008, vol. 
11, p. 163). 
 On the other hand, the Qur’an, while calling for the accuracy of information or 
reports, condemns spreading rumours and false news (the Qur’ān, 49:6). It also warns 
against damaging the reputation and honour of others (the Qur’ān, 24: 23).  
In a similar vein, the Prophet, in several authentic sayings, advises Muslims not to 
indulge in acts of falsehood, and instructs them how to make sure of the accuracy and truth 
of their reports. He said, ‘The worst falsehood is that a man makes his eyes see what they 
have not seen’ (Qutb, 2008, p. 163). Also ‘It is indeed a bad practice for a man to always 
begin his statement with “it is claimed”’ (Ibid.). Elsewhere, he is quoted as saying, ‘Refrain 
from assumption, for assumption is the basis of the worst lies’ (Ibid. p. 164). 
Based on these traditional instructions, is formulated the motto of scientific/research 
enquiry of Islam:  
 َليلهدلاف ًايعَّدم وأ َةحصلاف ًلاقان َتنك ْنإ 
If you are quoting, verify the source, yet if you are making a claim, give evidence (Al-Buti, 
1997, p. 34). 
 
Good or reliable media during the war or conflict should fulfil the following requirements: 
Being accurate, being impartial (keeping the balance), and being responsible. 
Being accurate refers to getting the correct information - which is one of the 
most important conditions. The facts as they happened, the spelling of names, 
evidence, and facts should be double-checked before being reported on. 
Impartiality (balance) refers to not taking sides. There are always two sides 
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in any conflict, and inclusion of both sides is essential for maintaining the 
balance. Responsibility is linked to the obligations of journalists to the society 
to whom they report the news and to the people they report about. Journalists 
should protect their sources and use honest methods to acquire the news 
(without breaking the law). (Dzabija, 2016, p, 20). 
 
These core values, if taken into consideration, enable media organizations, as a powerful 
tool, to reduce the causes of the conflict and to explore opportunities for resolution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Media outlets pretend to represent themselves as self-evidently dispassionate windows on 
the world. Yet, in fact, they constitute a propaganda system for specific interests (e.g. elite, 
regime, etc.).  
This study sought to identify the practices that account for the ethical crisis of the 
official and semi-official media reporting and disseminating news about the initial uprising 
in Syria. It has been seen how even the most obvious or hard facts were distorted, 
suppressed, marginalized and ignored by these media. For the last four decades, the regime, 
has succeeded in establishing a puppet media. The media, lacking in professional 
experience and media ethics, drove protestors and activists to disseminate a stream of 
information through the social media providing a competitive challenge to the regime’s 
narrative.   
Finally, the study in very brief highlighted Islamic standards of ethical media that 
pursue authentic and worthwhile news.   
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Endnotes 
 
1 Erich is a German social psychologist, who died in 1980. His statement is quoted in David Edwards and 
David Cromwell, Guardians of Power: The Myth of the Liberal Media, (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 1. 
2 Henry is an American writer, who died in 1918.  His statement is quoted in ibid., 10. 
3 According to abundant reports, the children were tortured in a number of methods, including nail plucking. 
This savage behavior was overseen by ‘Atif Najib, the President’s cousin, who was the head of the Political 
Security Directorate in Dar‘a at the time.  
4 The regime, fearful of the power of nonviolent opposition in neutralizing the power of the government, was 
desperately trying to provoke resistance into acts of violence. As Stephen Zunes  aptly notes the regime was 
“recognizing that the Syrian people were far more likely to support a regime challenged by an armed 
insurgency than through a largely nonviolent civil insurrection."  Stephen Zunes, “Supporting Unarmed Civil 
Insurrection in Syria, ”  in The Syria Dilemma, edited by Nader Hashemi, Danny Postel, (Massachusetts, The 
MIT Press, 2013), 107-108. On the militarization of the uprising see Emile, Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and 
the Fracturing of the Levant, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2013), 
81-92.  
5 On the role of the media as a facilitator of, and a threat to peacebuilding and conflict prevention see Piers 
Robinson, Philip Seib and Romy Frohlich (eds), Routledge Handbook of Media, Conflict and Security, 
(Routledge, 2016).  
6 Bashar al-Assad admitted that the militarization of the uprising took place during the above period.   
Retrieved October 9, 2015.   >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYLpZ-b501c<. 
7 A religious satellite television station based in Damascus, which was launched in July 2011.  
 >https://www.facebook.com/pg/nour.elsham.channel/about/?ref=page_internal <. 
8 A private TV station owned by Rami Makhlouf, Bashar al-Assad’s cousin. Retrieved July 8, 2019. 
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 >https://arabic.arabianbusiness.com/business/media-marketing/2009/jul/5/24071 <. 
9 See the video. Retrieved August 8, 2019  > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cykr1ee44NA <.  
10 See the video. Retrieved August 8, 2019  >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h6k7AVtstqo<. 
11 Due to the regime’s bloody repression of demonstrations, Aba Zayd announced his resignation. 
(April 23, 2011) Retrieved July 22, 2015. 
>http://www.islamtoday.net/albasheer/artshow-12-149530.htm<. 
 
12 The regime accused both men of being the brains behind the Dar‘a uprising  and of orchestrating alleged 
terrorist operations against security forces by Salafist radicals. They were charged with obtaining financial 
resources and weapons from Saudi-based Salafists, calling for jihad, instigating demonstrations, issuing a 
fatwa branding Syrian security forces as ‘Zionists’, and paying volunteers to attack security forces and burn 
down Ba’ath party headquarters. Reinoud Leenders & Steven Heydemann,  “Popular Mobilization in Syria: 
Opportunity and Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers,” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 17, no. 
2,  (July 2012): 152. The regime’s allegations are debunked in the article, 151-154.  
13 It is defined today as (Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Palestine). 
14 https://www.facebook.com/pg/nour.elsham.channel/about/?ref=page_internal 
15 This is based on my own observation for over 4 years. 
16  Retrieved May 2, 2018.   > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ufZkfbqNclo<. 
17 “Recordings from official Syrian channels show the same people being interviewed over and over in 
different parts of the country.”  Fares, 191. 
18 A good number of  my friends and relatives were among those who by force attended the pro-regime’s 
demonstrations.  
19
 Retrieved July 8, 2019 
>http://www.welateme.net/erebi/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=8459#.XVEdgPIzbIU < 
